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"Eminent domain is the public power of making a compulsory
purchase of private property for public use; and payment (either
made, or, by agreement of the parties, to be made) is an essential
part of the legal idea of a purchase, voluntary or compulsory.
Voluntary, and without payment, it is a donation; compulsory, and
without payment, it is robbery."-Doe, J., 54 N. H. 59o , 6I.
"The moment the idea is admitted into society that property is
not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of
law and public justice to protect it, anarchyand tyranny commence.
If 'Thou shalt not covet' and 'Thou shalt not steal' were not
commandments of Heaven, they should be made inviolable pre-
cepts, in every society, before it can be civilized, or made free."-
6 Works of John Adams, 9.
The right of eminent domain, whereby the State is justified
in taking private property for public use, against the owner's
consent, has been recognized from early times as a neces-
sary incident of sovereignty. It is an attribute inherent in
all governments, one of the jura majestatis, sometimes said
to be "the law of the existence of every sovereignty." At
this late day, when this right has been so long acquiesced in,
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there can be no reason for questioning its justice or for ex-
tolling its efficacy. The right exists, and the necessity is
conceded. Half a century ago, it was said to be too late to
set up any barrier to the power. "It has been," says the
court, "in constant exercise since the existence of society,
and must continue unrestricted so long as society shall
last." I
The statements occasionally met with, to the effect that
the right of eminent domain is absolute over the property of
the citizen, and that it has no limit but the necessities of the
State, must be understood as true only in a limited sense.
Were such expressions literally true, we should be to-day
living under an absolute despotism, and never be called upon
to witness the controversies so frequently occurring in the
courts, wherein the learning of the profession is challenged
by disputes growing out of the exercise of this conceded
right.
There being, then, certain limitations which condition the
lawful exercise of the right, and beyond which legislative
power cannot go, we shall consider the subject of com-
pensation as a check upon the right of eminent domain.
_. Compensation a Riglit not dependent upon Constitutional
Provisions. - Political philosophers long amused themselves
in striving to invent plausible theories which should account
for the organization of society and the creation of States,
seeking to deduce therefrom the respective rights and duties
of the governing and the governed. However interesting to
speculative minds may be the results they reached, they are
of. little practical importance, as intelligent thought is agreed
that the ultimate end and object of government is to protect
those rights which, as Blackstone denominates them, are
"the absolute rights of all mankind," - the right to personal
security, to liberty, and to property. An absolute power over
any one of these rights would be a power to destroy that
which the State is primarily bound to protect. It follows
that the power of the State, as conditioned by the law of
1 Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe R. Co., ii Leigh, 75.
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its own existence, must be a power with limitations. And,
in its application to the property of the citizen, it is a power
of interference confined to three classes of cases.
I. It may regulate the use and possession of property, so
far as may be necessary to guard against abuse, and protect
the rights of all. And this is generally called the police
power of the state.
2. It may take a portion-of the property of the citizen by
way of taxation, which goes to support the government, and
is the price which the remainder of his property must pay
for protection.
3. It may take private property for public use, under the
right of eminent domain.
And to these three classes is it agreed that the authority
of the State over the property of the citizen is confined.,
In the first of these cases, the property of the individual
is ordinarily not taken from his possession, but is only sub-
jected to those regulations as to use which are deemed nec-
essary for the good of all, it being an old maxim of the law,
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lczdas.
In the last two cases private property is taken, and for
public use, but with a distinction characterizing the respec-
tive powers which is fundamental, and of great importance.
Under the power of taxation, government takes the property
of the individual as his share of a justly imposed and ap-
portioned public burden, an equivalent being received in the
protection which government is thereby enabled to furnish
him. On the other hand, under the power of eminent do-
main his property is taken as something distinct from, and
more than his share of, a justly apportioned public burden.2
And it is because more than his apportioned share is taken
from him that it always has been regarded that the rendering
the owner a just compensation in return was an obligation
' Burlamaqui's Politic Law, pt. iii., ch. S, sec. 6; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
145.
2 The People v. The Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 19; Matter of
Dorrance Street, 4 R..I. 23r; McComb v. Bell, 2 Minn. 295; McBean v.
Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349, 36o; Cash v. Whitworth, 13 La. An. 403; Newby v.
Platte County. 25 Mo. 258, 269; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 355, 361,
per Agnew, J.
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which justice imposed upon the State, -a limitation condi-
tioning any lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain.
So that the right of eminent domain, sometimes said to
"override every other right," rides by no means "rough-
shod," but is restrained by the necessity of making the
owner a compensation which shall be an equivalent for the
injury done his private rights.
The necessity of compensation as a conditioning princi-
ple of the right of eminent domain has not been confined
to those States alone that are the most justly celebrated for
the reverence they pay to the sanctity of private rights;
but it has been a recognized principle even in governments
that are the most odious by reason of the absolute power
exercised over life ahd property. A remarkable instance of
this, mentioned by De Tott in his "Memoirs of the Turkish
Government," and quoted by Mr. Justice Waties in the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina, in 1796, may not be unin-
teresting in this connection. "The Sultan Mustapha," says
De Tott, "being desirous of building and endowing a new
mosque, fixed upon a spot, in the city of Constantinople,
which belonged to a number of individuals. He treated
with all of them for the purchase of their parts, and they
all willingly complied with his wishes except a Jew, who
owned a small house on the place, and who refused to give
it up. A considerable price was offered him, but he resisted
the most tempting offers. His partiality for the spot, or his
obstinacy, was stronger than his avarice. All the city was
astonished at his rashness, and expected every hour to see
his house demolished and his head upon a pole. But what
was the conduct of the sultan, - of one who was the abso-
lute master of the lives of millions? He consulted his
mufti, who answered that private property was sacred, that
the laws of the Prophet forbade his taking it absolutely, but
he might compel the Jew to lease it to him as long as he
pleased, at a full rent. The sultan submitted to the law."
In ancient Rome, at a time when it seemed a little uncer-
tain whether the State existed for the individual or the indi-
I Lindsaw v. The Commissioners, 2 Bay, 6o.
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vidual for the State, a scheme of the censors to supply the
city with water by means of an aqueduct was defeated, B. C.
179, as Tacitus tells us in his Annals, by the refusal of a
proprietor to permit it to be carried through his lands. So,
when a private house was damaged by the laying-out of a
public highway, the same writer tells us that the damages
were paid by the Emperor Tiberius, upon the petition of the
party to the Senate.
And in early English history it is recorded that in 1544,
when the English Parliament empowered the city of London
to appropriate private property for a public use, it attached
to the grant the condition that the property taken should be
paid for, upon the assessment of its value by commissioners
to be appointed by the lord chancellor.,
" No principle in English jurisprudence," it has been
said, "is better settled than that an individual cannot be
deprived of his property except for the public use, and for a
just compensation; and the British Parliament accordingly
never authorized one individual's property to be taken for
the private benefit of another, nor for public use, without
first providing a just equivalent for the owner."' In yet
another case, it has been said that "English history does not
furnish an instance of the kind; the Parliament, with all
their boasted omnipotence, never committed such an outrage
on private property. * * * Such an act would be a
monster in legislation, and shock all mankind." 3
This principle, that compensation is a necessary incident
to the exercise of the right of eminent domain, has been
regarded by all writers upon natural jurisprudence as an
acknowledged principle of universal law, and one founded
in natural equity.4 .
I Kent's Corn. 340.
' Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 258, 261.
3 Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 31o. And see i Bla.
Com. 139.
4 Gro. deJ. B., b. viii., ch. 14, sec. 7; Puffendorf DeJur. Nat. et Gen., b. viii.
ch. 5, sec. 7; Bynkershoeck Quest. Jur. Pub., b. ii., ch. 15; Burlamaqui's Pol-
itic Law, pt. iii., ch. 5, sec. 29.
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In our own country, it has been generally admitted that,
independent of all constitutional and statutory enactments, the
right to compensation is an inseparable incident to the exer-
cise of this power of eminent domain, and that, where the
law fails to provide compensation, an attempt to take private
property for public use is illegal and void. This point passed
under the attention of.Chancellor Kent in i816, the Consti-
tution of New York at that time containing no provision on
the subject. The chancellor, however, held that provision
for compensation was "an indispensable attendant" on the
exercise of the power, and that, until such a provision was
made, "it would be unjust, and contrary to the first princi-
ples of government," to allow the individual to be deprived
of his property.' In New Jersey the same conclusion was
reached, and the court declared it to be "a settled principle
of universal law that the right to compensation is an incident
to the exercise of the power; that the one is inseparably
connected with the other;" and they are said to exist "not as
separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and the
same principle." While it has been elsewhere said that
"the obligation to make just compensation is concomitant
with the right," 3 and the same conclusion has been reached
by other courts.
4
It should not pass without mention that in South Carolina
and Virginia a different view has been taken of this subject.
In the former State, the question seems to have arisen for the
first time in 1796, the Legislature having empowered the city
I Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 Johns.
io6.
2 Sinnickson v. Johnson, 2 Harr. 145.
3 Bonaparte v. Camden, etc., R. Co., i Baldw. 220.
4 Young v. McKenzie, 3 Kelly (Ga.), 31; Parham v. The Justices, 9 Ga.
341; Woodfolk v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 2 Swan, 422, 432; The State z'.
Glen, 7 Jones L. 321 ; Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550; Piscataqua Bridge
Co. v. New Hampshire Bridge Co., 7 N. H. 66; Petition of Mount Washington
R. Co., 35 N. H. 134, 141, 142; East Kingston v. Towle, 48 N. H. 57, 59,
6o; Eaton v. B. C. & M. R. Co., 51 N. H. 504, 510; Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.
H. 590, 599, 6o3, per Doe, J.; Hooker v. The New Haven R. Co., 14 Conn.
146, i5 1; The San Francisco R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 372.
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of Charleston to take land for highway purposes, but having
made no provision for compensation to the owners of the
land to be taken. For this reason it was sought to restrain
the commissioners, by an injunction, from proceeding to lay
out the highway. The Constitution of the State was silent
upon the subject; and the court being evenly divided in
opinion, the constitutionality of the act was sustained, and
no injunction issued, half of the court declaring that neither
Magna Charta nor the law of the land required compensa-
tion to be made where land was taken for highway purposes,
as every freeholder held subject to the public necessities.,
The conclusion thus reached was afterwards adhered to.
2
So, too, in Virginia, up to the time when the law expressly
required compensation to be made, the doctrine was uni-
formly asserted, in its broadest terms, that a right of way
might be taken for highway purposes and no compensation
need be provided.3
It is true that in Pennsylvania land was also taken for
highway purposes without compensation, but it was in con-
sequence of express reservations in the original grants, in
the earliest periods of the Commonwealth. The proprietor
took his land charged with the general public servitude of
highways. He received his compensation in advance, for
in every grant the State threw in, without charge, six acres
in the hundred, reserving to itself the right of making as
many roads through the land as the public interests might
require, without compensation.4 The very nature of the
reservation shows that otherwise it was expected that com-
pensation would be required. It is one of the many cases
where the exception proves the rule.
We have already noticed the fact that in New Jersey the
courts held compensation to be a necessary incident of the
Lindsay v. The Commissioners, 2 Bay, 38.
2 Patrick v. The Commissioners, 4 McCord, 541 ; McLanchlin v. The
Railroad Co., 5 Rich. 583, 599; The State v. Dawson, 3 Hill, xoo.
3 See Stokes v. Upper Appomattox Co., 3 Leigh, 337.
4 McClenachan v. Curwen, 6 Binn. 509. And see Beeson's Case, 3 Leigh,
821, 828.
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right of eminent domain, and yet even in this State, as in
Pennsylvania, it was customary to take land for highway
purposes without compensation. Nay, more; the Constitu-
tion of 1844, which expressly provided that compensation
must be made in taking private property for a public use,
declared that lands might be taken for highway purposes
without compensation, until the Legislature should see fit to
require otherwise. But the reason and explanation of this
is the same as in the case of Pennsylvania. The proprietors
of East and West Jersey, in their original grants, had re-
served the right to take land for highways, and had made
compensation in advance by allotting an extra allowance to
their grantees in consideration of the reservation.'
It is true that in the Constitution of the Federal as well as
in those of the several State governments, with but two ex-
ceptions, it has been deemed prudent to ificorporate, among
the fundamental articles of right, provisions requiring com-
pensation to be made whenever private property is taken
for public use. But these provisions are to be regarded not
as establishing a new principle of law, but only as placing
an old one beyond legislative control. As expressed by
Mr. Justice Miller in the Supreme Court of the United
States, these provisions have received "the commendation
of jurists, statesmen, and commentators, as placing the just
principles of the common law on that subject beyond the
power of ordinary legislation to change or control them." 2
Similar constitutional provisions were embodied in the
Constitution de la Republique Franfaise of 1795, in the Code
Napoleon, and in the constitutional charter of Louis XVIII.,
as well as in the Constitution of the Confederate States of
America. But, notwithstanding it has been deemed prudent
to incorporate these provisions into written constitutions,
it appears to be a principle, not only of the common law,
but of universal law, that the necessity of making just com-
pensation is a limitation upon the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain.
' The State v. Seymour, 35 N. J. L. 47, 53.
2 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 177.
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This fact, important in more lights than one, is especially
so in view of the farther fact that in the Constitutions of two
of the States there is no constitutional provision which ex-
pressly requires compensation to be made where private
property is taken for public use., The provision in the Con-
stitution of the United States is held to be a limitation
upon that government only, and in no manner applies to the
States.3
f. Mode of ascertaining Compensation.- A just compen-
sation, then, follows the right as "the shadow follows the
substance," and the two cannot be separated. It must be
apparent, therefore, that some definite mode must be pre-
scribed, in pursuance of which it may be determined, in each
particular case, what constitutes a just compensation to the
owner for the property of which he has been summarily
deprived.
As a rule, the constitutional provisions upon this subject
are silent as to the manner in which this shall be done. In
their silence, it must be presumed that it was intended to
leave the matter to legislative discretion; otherwise, the right
of eminent domain would be reduced to a nullity, and the
hands of government so fettered that the property of the
citizen could never be taken against his consent, there being
no method provided whereby he could be recompensed.
We say that his property could not be taken against his con-
stnt. The owner, if he was so disposed, might, of course,
suffer his property to be taken, and seek his redress for the
I New Hampshire and North Carolina.
2 Amendments to the Constitution, art. v.
3 Barron v. The City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Withers v. Buckley, 20
How. 84; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 176; Murphy v. The
People, 2 Cow. 815, 818; Jackson v. Wood, 2 Cow. 819; Livingston v'. The
Mayor, etc., of New York, 8 Wend. 85; Concord R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H.
47; Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590, 599, 6o6; Woodfolk v. The Nashville, etc.,
R. Co., 2 Swan, 422, 431; The Railroad Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. 459; John-
ston v. Rankin, 7o N. C. 550; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; Cairo, etc., R. Co.
v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494; North Missouri R. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490;
Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201.
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injury in an action at law, in which case the value of the
property would be recovered as from a wrong-doer. But if,
instead of consenting, he should be disposed to resist, there
would be no lawful power to overcome that resistance, as it
is held that the owner can never be compelled to resort to
an action at law to recover the value of property taken
under the right of eminent domain. Under the constitu-
tional provision that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation," it was never intended,
say the courts, to drive the owner into a lawsuit. " No such
obligation," it has been said, "can be imposed upon him;
he is entitled to the damages he has sustained, without re-
sorting to a legal tribunal to enforce the payment." x This
has been so well expressed by one of the most learned and
painstaking judges that to-day adorn the American bench,
that we cannot refrain from here quoting his language:
"There can be no necessity for casting upon him the bur-
den of any legal proceedings. Legal proceedings may be
necessary, and he may be entitled to notice if he can be
found; but, so far as such proceedings are necessary for his
enjoyment of his constitutional right, they are to be insti-
tuted and carried on by the public, because the public power
is limited by his reserved right. His property is taken with-
out payment, if it is taken with the payment of a sum pro-
curable only by his unremunerated outlay of an equal or
greater amount. And whether he must lose a sum equal to,
or greater, or less than his compensation, the principle is the
same." 2
The legislature, then, must in its discretion prescribe the
mode of assessing the owner's compensation. It must not
itself, however, undertake arbitrarily to fix the value of the
property, and by calling it a just compensation compel the
owner to receive it as such. What amounts to just com-
San Francisco v. Scott, 4 Cal. 114.
2 Orr v. Quimby. 54 N. H. 59 o , 642, per Doe, J. See also Piscataqua
Bridge Co. v. The New Hampshire Bridge Co., 7 N. H. 35, 70; Hall v. The
People, 57 Ill. 307, 316; Shepardson v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 6 Wis. 613;
Lee v. North-Western, etc., R. Co., 33 Wis. 222.
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pensation is a judicial question; and, moreover, the legisla-
ture cannot be a judge in its own cause., The discretion
with which the legislature is thus intrusted is not unlimited.
The owner has a right to insist that the legislature shall pro-
vide him with an impartial tribunal that shall hear evidence,
and where both parties may meet and discuss their claims
on equal terms,2 and nothing can be prescribed which shall
in any manner impair or destroy the rights of the owner to
his just compensation.3
For a long time it was eagerly contended before the
courts that any method of assessing damages without a jury,
and against the owner's refusal to waive a jury-trial, would
be unconstitutional and void; it having been supposed by
some that, under the general constitutional provisions secur-
ing the right of trial by jury, the owner was entitled to in-
sist that the case should be submitted to a jury, to pass upon
the amount of compensation which would be just to him in
that particular case.
The courts, however, have held from the beginning, with
perfect unanimity, that condemnation proceedings were not
embraced within the meaning of these constitutional pro-
visions, and that the owner could not, as a matter of right,
demand a jury-trial.4 The constitutional provisions relative to
the trial by jury relate to the trial of issues of fact in civil
and criminal proceedings, and have no reference to special
proceedings of condemnation under the right of eminent
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344; s. c., II Pet. 571;
United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 2 Biss. 174; County Court v. Gris-
wold, 58 Mo. 175, 199; Rich v. The Chicago R. Co., 59 Ill. 286; Isom v.
Mississippi, etc., R. Co., 36 Miss. 300.
2 Langford v. The Commissioners, x6 Minn. 375, 380.
3 Potter v. Ames, 43 Cal. 75.
4 Livingston v. The Mayor, etc., of New York, 8 Wend. 85; Raleigh,
etc., R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. 451; McIntire v. Western, etc., R. Co.,
67 N. C. 278; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lutheran Congregation of Pittsburgh,
53 Pa. St. 445; Mount Washington Road, 35 N. H. 134; Ames v. The
Lake Superior R. Co., 21 31inn. 241 ; Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 26 Texas, 588;
Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Milburn, 34 Texas, 224; Dronberger v. Reed, it
Ind. 420; Haverhill Bridge Co. v. County Commissioners, 103 Mass. 120;
Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 Ohio (pt. 2), 111.
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domain. "The trial by jury," it has been said, "is preserved
inviolate, in the sense of the Constitution, when in all criminal
cases, and in civil cases when a right is in controversy in a
court of law, it is secured to each party." In cases of this
description, the right to take and the right to compensation
are admitted; the only question is the amount, which may
be submitted to any impartial tribunal the legislature may
designate.,
The right to a jury-trial, however, to ascertain the amount
of compensation due the owner when his private property
is taken for a public use, has been provided and secured by
special provision in the Constitutions of Alabama,2 Colorado,3
Iowa,4 Maryland,5 Pennsylvania, 6 and West Virginia; 7 while
in Arkansas 8 and Missouri,9 a jury-trial is secured when a
corporation is interested on either side. In Illinois,1° it is
secured in all cases except those in which the taking is by
the State; and in New York,-x the amount is to be deter-
mined by a jury or commissioners, except when the taking
is by the State. In Michigan,12 too, private property cannot
be taken for public improvements in cities or villages, against
the consent of the owner, until compensation has been first
determined by a jury of freeholders. The tendency of the
times seems to have been in the direction of securing, in
almost all of the recent constitutions, the right of jury-trial
in cases where private property is taken under the right of
eminent domain.
It only remains, in this connection, to notice the principle
r Bonaparte v. Camden, etc., R. Co., i BaIdw. 205, 221.
Const. 1875, art. xiii., sec. 7.
3 Const. 1876, art. ii., sec. 15.
4 Const. 1857, art. i., see. i8.
S Const. 1867, art. iii., sec. 40.
6 Const. 1873, art. xvi., sec. 8.
7 Const. 1872, art. iii., sec. 9.
8 Const. 1874, art. xii., sec. 9.
9 Const. 1875, art. xii., sec. 4.
10 Const. 187o, art. ii., sec. 13.
Const. 1846, art. i., sec. 7.
2 Const. x85o, art. xv., sec. 15.
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that where the legislature provides the owner with a remedy
under a statute, that remedy is exclusive, and not cumula-
tive; 1 the rule being a general one, that where a statute
authorizes the doing of certain acts, the necessary conse-
quence of which is to damage the property of another, and
at the same time provides a remedy for the recovery of
damages resulting therefrom, the injured party is restricted
to the remedy thus provided. So it has been held, under
an act which contained no provision authorizing the owner
to institute an action for compensation in case the public
failed to do so, that such an action could not be maintained,
but only an action of ejectment, or trespass, or damages for
use and occupation, or injunction.2
II. Time of Compensation. -While the statement that
private property cannot be taken for public use without
just compensation is in itself unobjectionable as a principle
of law, it falls far short of expressing the true legal idea or
requirement upon this subject. "It sometimes appears," it
has been said, "to convey the idea that the owner's right is
not infringed if, in fact, at some time he be paid. But this
falls far short of the true doctrine. The constitutional re-
quirement is not satisfied by payment without regard to
time." 3
Now, an examination of the provisions upon this subject,
as found in the Constitutions at present in force in the sev-
eral States, will disclose certain important discriminations in
relation to the time of making compensation. And these
constitutional provisions may be classified as follows:
I. The provision is silent as to time. "Private property
I Colcough v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 2 Head, I71; Lafayette, etc., R. Co.
v. Smith, 6 Ind. 249; Teick v. Board of Commissioners, ii Minn. 292, 295;
Aldrich v. Cheshire R. Co., 21 N. H. 359; Mason v. Kennebec. etc., R. Co.,
31 le. 215; Lindell v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 36 Mo. 543; Brown v. Beatty,
34 Miss. 227; McIntire v. Western, etc. R. Co., 67 N. C. 278; Henniker v.
Contoocook Valley R. Co., 29 N. H. 152.
2 Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Streeter, 8 Kan. 133.
3 Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 59 o , 643.
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shall not be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion." I
In three of the Constitutions, however, there is, in ad-
dition to this general provision, a special provision some-
what qualifying the general one, and requiring compensa-
tion to be first made, where the taking is by a corporation.2
2. The provision is specific as to time, and requires com-
pensation to be first made. "Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation first made
therefor." 3
3. The provision, while in general requiring compensation
to be first made, expressly excepts those cases where the
taking is by the State itself, giving the State its election to
make compensation prior or subsequent to the taking.4
4. The provision is, that "private prioperty shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation first made
or secured." 5
So, in the Constitutions of Oregon and Texas, already
cited, it is sufficient in the ordinary cases if the amount
of compensation is secured.
x Arkansas, Const. 1874, art. ii., sec. 22; California, Const. 1849, art. i., sec.
8; Connecticut, Const. r818, art. i., sec. ix i Delaware, Const. 1831, art, i., sec.
8; Florida, Const. 1868, art. i., sec. 9; Illinois, Const. 1870, art. ii., see. I3;
Louisiana, Const. 1868, tit. vi., art. Iio; Maine, Const. 182o, art. i., sec. 21;
Massachusetts, Const. 1780, pt. i., art. io; Michigan, Const. 185o, art. xviii., sec.
14; Nebraska, Const. 1875, art. i., sec. 21 ; New Jersey, Const. 1844, art. i.,
sec. 16; New York, Const. 1846, art. i., sec. 6; Rhode Island, Const. 1842,
art. i., sec. 16; Tennessee, Const. 1870, art. i., sec. 21 ; Vermont, Const. 1793,
ch. i., art. 2; Virginia, Const. 187o, art. v., sec. 14; West Virginia, Const. 1872,
art. iii., sec. 9; Wisconsin, Const. 1848, art. i., sec. 13; United States. Const.
1787, amendment v.
2 Arkansas, art. xii., sec. 9; Michigan, art. xv., sec. 9; West Virginia, art.
iii., sec. 9.
3 Alabama, Const. 1875, art. i., sec. 24; Colorado, Const. 1876, art. ii., sec.
15; Georgia, Const.- 1877, sec. iii.. pt. i ; Kentucky, Const. 1850, art. xiii., sec.
14; Maryland, Const. 1867, art. iii., sec. 4o; Mississippi, Const. 1868, art. i.,
see. io; Missouri, Const. 1875, art. ii., sec. 21.
4 Indiana, Const. r851, art. i., sec. 21 ; Oregon, Const. 1857, art. i., sec. i9;
Texas, Const. 1876, art. i., sec. 17.
5 Iowa, Const. 1857, art. i., sec, IS; Minnesota, Const. 1857, art. i., sec. 13;
Pennsylvania, Const. 1873, art. i., sec. Io.
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5. The provision is, that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation first paid or
secured, except in cases of war, riot, fire, or great public
peril, in which case compensation shall be made afterwards."'
6. The provision is, that " private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation first made
or secured in money, except in time of war, or other public
exigency imperatively requiring its immediate seizure, or
for the purpose of making or repairing roads which shall
be open to the public without a charge, when compensation
may be made afterwards.'"2
The Constitution of Kansas seems only to provide for
cases where a right of way is taken by a corporation, when
compensation is required to be first made in money, or se-
cured.3 And the provision contained in the Constitution of
South Carolina is so peculiar and unique that we give it en-
tire.4 Under this provision it would seem to be implied that
property might be taken for a private use, provided compen-
sation was made. It seems to recognize no distinction
between a taking for a private and for a public use, and in
that respect to be different from the provisions in other con-
stitutions. But whether property can be taken or not for a
private use is a subject to be considered farther on.
To recur, then, to the element of time, and to those pro-
visions which we have classified under the first of these six
heads, as specifying no particular time when compensation
is to be made, it is to be remarked,-
I. That it was never intended by these provisions to pro-
hibit the law-making power from authorizing a temporary
entry upon private property as a proceeding incipient to
I Nevada, Const. 1864, art. i., sec. S.
2 Ohio, Con.t. i851, art. i., sec. 19.
3 Kansas, Const. 1859, art xii., sec. 4.
4 Const. i868, art. i., sec. 23: "Private property shall not be taken or applied
for public use, or for the use of a corporation, or for private use, without the
consent of the owner, or a just compensation being made therefor; .provided,
however, that laws may be made securing to persons or corporations the right
of way over the lands of either persons or corporations, and for works of in-
ternal improvement, the right to establish depots, stations, turnouts, etc., but a
just compensation shall, in all cases, be first made to the owner."
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condemnation, in order that the exact property which is to
be taken may be located and determined. They were not
designed, neither have they ever been held, to so operate.
As a matter of necessity, it must be permitted to go upon
the land for the purpose of making the preliminary surveys,
for it would be impossible to make compensation for land
until it should be first ascertained exactly what land was to
be taken.,
2. That it- was intended to prohibit the law-making power
from ever authorizing any permanent occupation or appropri-
ation of private property to public use, or the acquiring of
any title to or interest in it, until just compensation has been
first made or tendered the owner. Whatever view may at
first have been taken of this subject in some quarters, the
above may now be fairly stated as the recognized rule.2
3. It was intended by these provisions, and the courts so
hold, that this right of temporary entry and occupation, for
the purpose of surveying and determining the exact prop-
erty to be tiken, should be lost and become extinct by un-
reasonable delay in instituting and perfecting condemnation.3
4. It was intended that private property should not be
I Bonaparte v. Camden, etc., R. Co., i Baldw. 226; Young v. McKenzie, 3
Kelly (Ga.). 31; Bloodgood v. Mohawk, etc., R. Co., iS Wend. 9, 17, 34;
Polly v. Saratoga, etc., R. Co., 9 Barb. 449; Walther v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277;
Fox v. Western Pacific R. Co., 31 Cal. 538; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247;
Nichols v. Sorn, etc., R. Co., 43 Me. 358; The State v. Seymour, 35 N. J. L.
47, 53; Lyon v. Green Bay, etc., R. Co., 42 Wis. 544.
2 Doe v. Georgia R. Co., x Ga. 524; Young v. McKenzie, 3 Kelly (Ga.),
524; Bonaparte v. Camden, etc., R. Co., r Baldw. 205. 226; Bloodgood v.
Mohawk, etc., R. Co.. iS Wend. 9; Blodgett v. Utica, etc., R. Co., 64 Barb.
58o; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247; Powers v. Bears, 12 Wis. 213. 222,
Brock v. Hishen, 4o W.is. 681; Davis v. San Lorenzo R. Co., 47 Cal, 517:
Brady v. Bronson, 45 Cal. 640; San Mateo Water-Works v. Sharpstein, 50
Cal. 284; McAulay v. Western Vermont, etc., R. Co., 33 Vt. 311 ; Gray v.
First Division of St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 13 Minn. 315, 322 (arising tinder the
Constitution of the United States, under a territorial charter); Hursh v. First
Division, etc., 17 Minn. 439; Warren v. First Division. etc., iS Minn. 384,
396; Hall v. The People, 57 Ill. 307, 316; The People v. Williams, 5 Ill.
63; Shute v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 26 Il1. 436; The People v. McRoberts, 62
Il. 38.
3 Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247; Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water Co.,
13 Cal. 3o6.
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taken until after compensation had been made, and, there-
fore, that the execution of any authority which the law might
profess to give, to take and appropriate the property, would be
enjoined by injunction until this should be done; ' or, if the
wrong had been already done, possession of the property
having been actually taken, that the owner should be entitled
to recover possession by an action of ejectment,2 or, main-
taining an action of trespass, recover damages for all injuries
occasioned by the unlawful occupation.3
Where authorized agents have once entered as trespassers,
having taken possession before making compensation, a sub-
sequent tender of compensation for the land taken will not
bar an action by the owner to recover damages in trespass
for the previous wrongful occupation.4
The principle that where compensation is not made to the
owner previous to the entry he is entitled to bring ejectment
or maintain trespass, may at first blush seem to contravene
that other principle of law before noticed, that holds the
statutory remedy to be exclusive. There is, however, a well-
defined and a reasonable distinction between an action
which denies that property has been lawfully taken and
demands damages therefor, and one which admits the right
to take and asks for a compensation, which, when received,
I Bonaparte v. Camden, etc., R. Co., I Baldw. 205, 226; The People v.
Law. 34 Barb. 494; Parham v. The justices, 9 Ga. 341; Strohecker v. Ala-
bama, etc., R. Co., 42 Ga. 509; Davis v. La Crosse, etc., R. Co., 12 Wis. 16;
Shute v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 26 Ill. 436; Ford v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 14
Wis. 609; Jersey City, etc., R. Co. v. Jersey City, etc., R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq.
6o; Stacey v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 27 Vt. 14.
2 Doe v. Georgia R. Co., i Ga. 524; Gardner v. Tisdale, 2 Wis. 153;
Weisbrod v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 21 Wis. 602; Wager v. Troy Union R.
Co., 25 N. V. 526; Lazier v. New York Central R. Co., 42 Barb. 466;
Nichols v. Lewis, 15 Conn. 136; McClinton v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 66 Pa.
St. 404; Chicago, Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Knox College, 34 Il1. 195.
3 Bloodgood v. Mohawk, etc., R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 20, 77; Loop v. Cham-
berlain, 2o Wis. 135; Gray v. First Division, etc., 13 Minn. 315 (construing a
territorial charter); Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247; Hall v. Pickering, 4o Me.
548; Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Ferris, 26 Texas, 588; Harrisburg v. Crangle, 3
Watts & S. 464.
4 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Ward, io Kan. 352.
VOL. V. NO. I. 2
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will establish in the other party the right to continue in pos-
session. And this distinction the law recognizes and acts
upon.'
While the payment of compensation is a condition pre-
cedent to any right of entry, the owner may waive his right
to insist upon prepayment, in which case the public is not a
tort-feasor, although it takes permanent possession. In such
case the owner is held to have consented to let the damages
be and remain a mere debt against the public. It is said
that if the owner, "for the shortest period," clearly gives the
public, either by his express consent or by his silence, to
understand that he does not intend to object to the entry,
but waives his claim to present payment, that he is thus
concluded by his own act from afterwards asserting his claim
by injunction or ejectment, so as to hinder or prevent the
improvement undertaken.2 For example, in the case of rail-
roads, the court would not issue an injunction and thus stop
the running of the road, but would enter a decree directing
compensation to be paid out of the revenues of the road; 3
or, if the circumstances of the case seemed to demand it,
would undoubtedly put the road into the hands of a receiver
until the damages were paid.4 It is even held constitutional
to limit the time within which the owner can recover com-
pensation, and to provide that if proceedings are not insti-
tuted within the period, then his right shall be barred.
But in such cases the statute must permit the owner to
institute proceedings, and provide him with an adequate
remedy to that end.5
I Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Weaver, io Kan. 344; Daniels v. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co., 35 Iowa, 129; Ford v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 14 Wis. 6og; Smith v.
Chicago, etc., R. Co., 67 Ill. x9.
2 McAuley v. The Western Vermont Ry., 33 Vt. 31i ; Knapp v. McAuley,
39 Vt. 275; Provolt v. The Chicago, etc., R. Co., 57 Mo. 256; Baker v. The
Chicago, etc., R. Co., 57 Mo. 265; New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Moyc, 39
Miss. 374; South Carolina R. Co. v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 13 Rich. Eq.
339; Hentz v. Long Island R. Co., 13 Barb. 646.
3 Hamilton v. Annapolis, etc., R. Co., x Johns. Ch. (Md.) 107.
4 2 Redf. Am. Railw. Cas. (2d ed.) 253.
5 The People v. Green, 3 Mich. 496; Rexford v. Knight, ii N. Y. 308.
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While the decisions seem to have established the rule of
law as imperatively requiring compensation to be made pre-
vious to entry, unless the owner waives his right thereto,
they are not to be understood as requiring the amount to be
actually paid and handed over to him before such entry.
The principle of the cases is, that the owner should not be
left dependent upon the solvency of individuals or corpora-
tions. It is therefore held to be sufficient if an adequate
fund is provided, which shall be a security to the owner.'
As to what constitutes a sufficient security, it has been
said that "any irrevocable deposit, appropriation, or dispo-
sition of money, any indemnifying obligation incurred or
provision made, that affords the proprietor legal security
(for payment, and for the necessary expense of obtaining it),
convertible into compensation at his option, as good as is
legally practicable under the circumstances, is reasonable
legal security. It is legally sufficient in amount if, upon
such evidence as is available, it appears to be sufficient for
his indemnity, and is subject to subsequent increase or
diminution upon its being made to appear that it is unrea-
sonably small or large. A sum of money so deposited that
he can legally avail himself of it is security of a legal char-
acter." 2
And here it becomes necessary to advert to a distinction
which has been recognized by the courts in numerous de-
cisions. It is a distinction existing between a taking of
property by the State, or a county, or a town, and a taking
by an individual or a private corporation. While in the
latter case, as we have seen, it is indispensable that the owner
should be first paid, or provided with a certain and definite
fund from which payment can be obtained, in the former
Bloodgood v. Mohawk, etc., R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 39, 76 (1837); Pitts-
burgh v. Scott, i Pa. St. 309; The Commonwealth v. Wood, Io Pa. St. 97;
Doe v. Georgia R. Co., i Ga. 524; White v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 7 Heisk.
518; Anderson v. Turbeville, 6 Coldw. I50; Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Ferris, 26
Texas, 588, 602.; Bohlman v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 30 Wis. 105; Ash v. Cum-
mings, 5o N. II. 591; Kramer v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 5 Ohio St. 140, 147
(under old Constitution).
2 Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 59
o
, 644.
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case, on the other hand, it is not regarded as essential that
compensation should be secured in advance, upon a definite
fund, provided the law contains a provision for compensa-
tion. It is said that the presumption is that municipalities
are always responsible, and their property a fund to which
the owner can resort without risk of loss.' And while it is
held that the municipal power of taxation is in such cases,
ordinarily, adequate security to the owner, yet, if it should
be clearly shown that this power was, for any reason, inade-
quate to furnish payment within a reasonable time, the court
would interpose until adequate security should be provided.2
An examination of the cases already cited recognizing a
distinction between a taking by the State and a taking by
individuals shows that it is essential, however, that the law
should contain a provision authorizing compensation to be
made, it otherwise being void.3 This is subject to the quali-
fication that the act shall be held valid, provided a subsequent
act is passed curing the defect.4
It was, however, held, in a recent New Hampshire case,
that the government could take the property of the citizen
for a public use although thg law contained no provision for
payment out of a definite fund. 5 But from this conclusion
Justice Doe dissented, in a remarkably able and exhaustive
opinion, in which he repudiates the whole doctrine which
distinguishes between a taking by the State and by a private
individual. "It maintains a distinction," he says, "that does
not exist in law or fact, between the purse of a nation, state,
county, city, town, school-district, or any municipal part of
the public, and the purse of other corporations and indi-
viduals. It holds the former to be an adequate and the
I Bloodgood v. Mohawk, etc., R. Co., iS Wend. 9, x8, 37, 39, 76; Chap-
man v. Gates, 54 N. Y. 132; Monongahela Nay. Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & S.
114; McClinton v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 66 Pa. St. 404; Loweree v. New-
ark, 38 N. J. L. I51; Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591, 621.
2 Keene v. Bristol, 26 Pa. St. 46; Long v. Fuller, 68 Pa. St. 170.
3 See also McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 5oo.
4 McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500; Bonaparte v. Camden, etc., R. Co., I
Baldw. 205.
5 Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590.
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latter an inadequate fund, without any inquiry into the fact.
In assuming that municipalities are always responsible and
always honest, and that nobody else can be safely trusted, it
avers what everybody knows is not true. It asserts a moral
certainty of voluntary payment in the municipal class of
cases, and denies it in every other class, in entire disregard
of all grounds of moral assurance. Professing to reject the
technical view, and the legal certainty of constitutional rights,
and to introduce the high moral authority of reason and
justice, it starts with the municipal distinction, a technicality
and fiction that shuts out reason and justice, and excludes
the merits and equities of the case from consideration.
Claiming to found the distinction upon historical fact, it
ignores the painful circumstances of the disbandment of the
American army in 1783, the deplorable condition of the
finances at that time and afterwards, and the numerous
Federal, State, and municipal bankruptcies and repudiations
(some of them not recorded in judicial decisions, because the
debtors were not suable) that are conspicuous in our annals.' '
Attention has been called to the fact that in one or two
instances it has been thought best to provide expressly, in
the constitutional provisions on this subject, that in time of
war, or impending public danger, property might be ap-
propriated first and compensation provided afterwards.
Unquestionably there are extraordinary and unforeseen
occasions when it becomes imperatively necessary that
property should be thus appropriated, there being no oppor-
tunity to make compensation at the time. And this may be
lawfully done as well under the provision which is most
general as under those that are the more specific.2
This general provision that private property cannot be
taken for public use without just compensation, found in the
large majority of the American constitutions, is construed to
mean, (I) that there is no right of entry until compensation
is first made or secured; (2) that in case of the State, com-
I Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 651.
2 Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 134; United States v. Russell, 13
Wall. 623.
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pensation need not be first made, nor secured upon a specific
fund, if the law provides for compensation; (3) that in time
of war, or great danger, property may be taken without com-
pensation being first made, secured, or provided for, but an
obligation is imposed upon the public to compensate the
owner thereafter. And so it appears that, notwithstanding
the constitutional provision be general, the rights of the
owner are as sacredly guarded on the one hand, and the
necessities of the State as surely provided for on the other,
as though the provision were specific in its nature.
We do not deem it necessary to here go into examina-
tion of the other and specific constitutional provisions as
regards the question of time. What has already preceded,
together with the fact that these remaining provisions are
specific in themselves, seem to render it unnecessary. It
may be stated, however, that though the provision may ex-
pressly require compensation to be first made, it has been
held sufficient if it be secured,' and that there may be an
entry for the purposes of a preliminary survey without hav-
ing paid, or secured payment.'
1V Amount of Compensation. - The amount of compen-
sation which the owner is entitled to receive, and the public
under obligation to give, for the property taken is a question
which is simple in so far as it requires an equivalent to be
given for that which is taken. "Just compensation" means
an equivalent, -a quid pro quo.3 _ The question, simple
enough so far, becomes complex from a multiplicity of ele-
ments the moment it becomes necessary to analyze and de-
termine just what constitutes the elements of loss and injury
for which this quid pro quo is to be furnished. In such a
I Cashweller's Heirs v. McIlroy, , Marsh. 84; Jackson v. Winn's Heirs, 4
Litt. 322, 328.
2 Stewart v. The Mayor, etc., 7 Md. 500.
3 Bloodgood v. Mohawk, etc., R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 35; Keasy v. Louisville,
4 Dana, 154, 155; Winona, etc., R. Co., zo Minn. 267, 280; Cunningham v.
Campbell, 33 Ga. 625, 635; Bonaparte v. Camden, etc., R. Co., i Baldw.
205, 227; Henry v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 2 Iowa, 288; Virginia, etc., R.
Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 165.
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case, the rules which govern are not always easy of applica-
tion, and the difficulty is sometimes increased by the marked
conflict of opinion which the decisions of the courts so
lamentably betray.
As a taking of private property for public use may give
rise to three distinct classes of cases, we shall prefer to
consider separately each of these classes. They are,-
I. Where the public improvement requires all the land of
the owner to be taken.
2. Where the public use is satisfied by a taking of a part
only of the owner's property.
3. Where no portion of the owner's property is taken
absolutely, but suffers depreciation in value, or consequential
damages.
In the first of these cases, where the whole of the owner's
property is taken, the question of compensation is compar-
atively easy of solution, the governing principles being of
ready apprehension.
First, Compensation must be made in lawful money of
the United States.' The State has no right to demand, and
cannot compel, the owner to take in payment other -land,
which it might consider a fair exchange for that which it
has appropriated.' So, in constructing a canal, and taking
lands for that purpose, it cannot force the owner to receive
canal-scrip as compensation, but he must be furnished with
a pecuniary or money equivalent.3 So, too, it has been held
that an award of "one hundred and fifty dollars, witki a
wagon-way and a stop for cattle," is void.4 Not only is it
beyond the power of the legislature to provide for the pay-
ment of compensation in any thing but money, but that
money must be paid at once, and the owner cannot be com-
pelled to take time-certificates, and thus postpone his right
to receive the same after the award becomes a finality. At
Jones v. The Wills Valley R. Co., 30 Ga. 43.
2 Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 315.
3 McCormick v. The President, etc., i Cart. (Ind.) 48.
4 Central Ohio R. Co. v'. Holler, 7 Ohio St. 225.
5 Butler v'. Sewer Commissioners, to be reported in io Vroom.
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this time, when long-ago exploded notions of finance are
being popularized to satisfy the demands of the ignorant, or
worse than ignorant, the following bit of irony may at least fur-
nish a crumb of satisfaction to those who see no good in "fiat"
money: "Compensation is not rendered unnecessary," so
it has been recently said, "by the fact that it may be made
in government notes. The less they are worth, the more of
them is the plaintiff entitled to. Whether the nominal mar-
ket value of property does or does not keep itself precisely
adjusted to a depreciated currency, and whether such a cur-
rency is better or worse than any other, the right of prop-
erty is not violated, in contemplation of law, by payment in
such things as are held to be constitutional cash by the
highest constitutional authority."
Second, The owner is entitled to the full and fair market
value of the property.
2
Under the rule as thus stated, there is excluded all con-
sideration of the necessity of the public to purchase, or of
the owner to sell, as well as endearments of association, or
the reluctance of the owner to part with the property to be
taken; as he might not be willing to sell, even at any price,
however unreasonable.3 In valuing lands taken for public
use, there must, of course, be something adopted as a meas-
ure of value, and it seems to be conceded that market
prices are the only measures of value which courts and
juries can employ; that any other standard of value would
be necessarily fanciful and arbitrary, useless to the extent it
was fanciful, unjust to the degree it was arbitrary.4 "The
value of land or any thing else," it has been iaid, "is its
price in the market." 5 Market prices were expressly de-
Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 59 o , 619.
2 Somerville, etc., R. Co. v. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495; Giesey v. Cincinnati,
etc., R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308; Matter of Furman Street, 17 Wend. 649, 670;
Matter of William, etc., Streets, 39 Wend. 678, 69o; Central Pacific R. Co. v.
Pearson, 35 Cal. 247, 261 ; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227, 242; East Pennsyl-
vania R. Co. v. Hollenstine, 47 Pa. St. 28.
3 Henderson, etc., R. Co. v. Dickerson, 17 B. Mon. 173, 178.
4 Searle v. Lackawanna, etc., R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 57.
Harrison v. Young, 9 Ga. 359.
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clared to be the standard of value in the French law upon
this subject, in their carefully prepared and famous system
sur les expropriations pour cause d'utiZit publique.y
In determining what the market value is in such cases, the
question is not what the property would bring for cash at a
forced sale. It is surely enough that the owner is forced by
compulsory process to part with his property against his
will, and the public necessity cannot require the property to
be ruthlessly sacrificed, as property unhappily too often is
under such sales. On the contrary, the owner is en-
titled to the value the property would bring to a prudent
seller, at liberty to fix the time and conditions of sale.
"The standard of value," it has been said, " is not the price
it would bring at a forced sale, but what, in the opinion of
practical and judicious men, it is reasonably worth, taking in
view its fitness for the purposes for which it was intended,
and the time when, according to the reasonable and natural
progress of improvement and growth in that particular
locality, it would be required for those purposes ." 2 " The
fair cash value of the property taken for public use," is
the language employed in another case, " if the owner were
willing to sell and the government desired to buy at that
time and place, and in that form, would be the measure of
just compensation." 3
In determining what is the market value, it is well settled
that the opinions of witnesses acquainted with the value of
the property in controversy are admissible in evidence.4
But these opinions are admissible, it is said, not because they
are the opinions of experts, strictly so called, as they "are
not founded on special study or training, or professional ex-
perience, but rather from necessity, upon the ground that
I Law i8io, arts. x6, 17.
2 Somerville, etc., R. Co. v. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495.
3 Cox v. Cummings, 33 Ga. 549, 559.
4 Kellogg v. Krauser, I4 Serg. & R. 137; Clark v. Baird, 5 Seld. 183;
Dwight v. County Commissioners, II Cush. 203 ; Shattuck v. Stoneham, etc.,
R. Co., 6 Allen, 1I6, I17; Warren v. Wheeler, 2I Me. 484; Lafayette. etc.,
R. Co. v. Winslow, 66 Ill. 219; Keithsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Henry, 79 Ill.
290; Logansport v. McMillen. 49 Ind. 493.
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they depend upon knowledge which any one may acquire,
but which the jury may not have, and that they are the
most satisfactory, and often the only attainable, evidence of
the fact to be proved." '
It is, however, held inadmissible to introduce evidence
showing what prices parties had offered to purchase at,2 and
equally improper to show what the owners have offered to
sell at.3 So, too, it has been held inadmissible to show the
valuation which the owner put on his property before the
assessors. 4 In California and Pennsylvania, it was held im-
proper to show particular instances of sales; 5 while in Mas-
sachusetts, on the other hand, it was held admissible to show
the price for which adjacent lots had been actually sold,
open, of course, to any evidence explanatory of the circum-
stances attending the sale, and tending to show why the
purchasers gave a price greater than the true value.6 And
in Iowa, it was held improper to show the price paid for a
right of way through adjoining tracts, unless it was first
shown that there was a uniformity in the character of the
lands.7 In the Massachusetts case already cited, 6 it is said
that, if the price paid had not been voluntary, but had been
fixed by a jury, or in some other compulsory way, evidence
of the sale would have been excluded. And in another
case, it was expressly decided that evidence was inadmissible
as to what the public was compelled to pay for land adjoin-
ing.8 In a Rhode Island case, it was held that evidence could
not be introduced to show what the public had paid other
parties, in compromise of suits pending on appeal for land
r Swan v. Middlesex, io Mass. 73, 877.
2 Davisv. Charles River, etc., R. Co., ii Cush. 5o6; St. Joseph, etc., R.
Co. v. Orr, 8 Kan. 419.
3 Lehmicke v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 89 Minn. 464; Montclair R. Co. v.
Benson, 36 N. J. L. 557.
4 Virginia, etc., R. Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 865.
5 Central Pacific R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247, 261 ; East Pennsylvania
R. Co. v. Heister, 40 Pa. St. 53.
6 Wyman v. Lexington, etc., R. Co., 13 Metc. 3x6, 326.
7 King v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 34 Iowa, 458.
8 White v. Fitchburg R. Co., 4 Cush. 400.
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damages, although the lands were similarly situated with the
property in dispute; offers made in compromise of litigation
were said to be no evidence of market value, and though if
they were, should be excluded upon grounds of public
policy., It has been decided, however, that it is proper to
show the consideration expressed in the deeds by which
the owner obtained title, especially if it appear that the pur-
chases have been recently made, as it might tend to eluci-
date the question of value. The jury had a right, so it was
said, to all evidence which in any degree, however slight,
tended to enlighten that issue.2 So, too, evidence has been
held admissible as to the price obtained at an administrator's
sale of an undivided part of the property in question.3
Under the rule that the measure of value is the market
price, it was held, in Pennsylvania, in a case where a rail-
road sought to obtain an easement in coal lands for a
right of way, that evidence was properly excluded the ten-
dency of which was to show that there was over an acre of
coal under the road, worth $4,000, which would be lost to the
owner, as it was necessary to leave it untouched for the
support of the road. As the point is one of much impor-
tance, we quote the language of the courtupon that occasion:
"Now, if such a fact," it was said, "were necessary to the
ascertainment of the value of the land taken, it would be
wise to accept the testimony of experts, for we ought
always to seek the best sources of information. The ob-
jection is not to the experts, but to the facts themselves.
We do not measure the value of land by such facts. Land
may have $4,000 worth of coal per acre in it, and yet sell at
$4 o per acre.
"When a man has to sell his property, of course he must
take the market value for it. That is measured by the custom
or common dealing of the country. If it is land, the market
value is measured by the price usually given for such land
in that neighborhood, making due allowance for differences
Howard v. City of Providence, 6 R. I. 514.
2 Jones v. The Chicago, etc., R. Co., 68 Ill. 380.
3 March v. Portsmouth, etc., R. Co., 19 N. H. 372.
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of position, soil, and improvement. Value may be very ap-
proximately estimated in that way, for it is not then founded
upon the mere opinion of witnesses, but on the fact of a
general market value. * * * In the present case, the
jur-y-were permitted to find in favor of the plaintiff the full
value of the land as coal land, though the defendant gets no
title to the coal further than it is needed to support the sur-
face. Then the plaintiff has been allowed the full value of
the land as estimated by the common standard, and we do
not see how we can take any other. The one here proposed
has never been publicly sanctioned, and that is something
against it. It would require us to ascertain the possible
value of the products of the land, in order to get at the value
of the land itself. But the products do not exist, and there-
fore have no value; for value here means value in money in
the market, and this cannot apply to products not yet in ex-
istence. And, then, to use the products as a standard of
value is to apply an uncertain measure in order to obtain a
certain result. It is easier to value the land directly, than
thus.
"Moreover, the offer impliedly requires a degree of refine-
ment in the measure of values which seems to us totally
incompatible with the gross estimates of common life.
Though we might have the most accurate calculation of
the quantity of coal in the land, yet, without knowing
exactly the expense of bringing it to the surface and carry-
ing it to market, and the amount likely to be lost in mining
and conveying, and the times in which it would be brought
out, and the market prices at those times, the quantity would
not help us to value the land."I
Third, The value of the property is to be estimated as of
the time when condemnation proceedings are instituted, in
distinction from the time when the public may have unlaw-
fully entered and taken possession.2
Searle v. Lackawana, etc., R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 57, 63, 64.
Sherwood v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 21 'Minn. 122; San Francisco, etc., R.
Co. v. Mahoney, 29 Cal. x12; Driver v. Western Union R. Co., 32 Wis.
569; Cook v. The Commissioners, 66 Ill. 115 .
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In accordance with this rule, it is held that where the pub-
lic finds itself under the necessity of purchasing additional
property, to enlarge or complete a public improvement pre-
viously undertaken, it must pay the owner the then value of
his property, although the increase in value may be the
direct and immediate result of the improvement which it
has already made. As where the water-commissioners of
Providence, having determined to build a reservoir, took
certain land for that purpose, the improvement adding con-
siderably to the value of the adjacent property. Afterwards
it was found necessary to take an additional piece of prop-
erty, and proceedings were soon instituted to condemn it;
and it was held that the owner was entitled to its value at
the time of condemnation, and not at the time of the loca-
tion of the reservoir. The public had to pay for the
enhanced value it had itself caused.'
As a farther exemplification of this same principle are
those cases where the State, or its agents, before instituting
condemnation proceedings, has gone on and placed improve-
ments upon the property without the owner's consent. The
question has then been raised, whether the public must pay
for the land, with the improvements so annexed, or whether
it would be entitled to have them disregarded in estimating
the value of the property of which the owner was to be de-
prived. Of course, in all ordinary cases, it is a cardinal rule
of the law, that whatever is wrongfully annexed to the realty
becomes a part of it, and goes to the owner. The prin-
ciple is an ancie nt one in the law.2 It has, however,
been raised as an interesting question, whether or not
an exception should not be made in favor of annexations
made by the public under such circumstances; it being
urged that all the owner was entitled to was a "just com-
pensation," and that there was no justice in compelling
the public to pay him for that which cost him absolutely
nothing. It has been ruled, in Wisconsin, that it is proper
I Stafford v. Providence, io R. 1. 567. See also Virginia, etc., R. Co. v.
Lovejoy, 8 Nev. Ioo.
2 Britton's Pleas of the Crown, ch. 33.
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to make an exception in such cases in favor of the public,
and the same thing was at first held in California." A sim-
ilar doctrine has been recently announced by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, two of the judges dissenting.2 In
the last case, stress seems to have been laid on the fact that
the railroad had been clothed by the State with the right of
eminent domain, and that therefore it could not properly
be regarded as an ordinary tort-feasor. The court say:
"This is not the case of a mere trespass by one having no
authority to enter, but of one representing the State herself,
clothed with the power of eminent domain, having a right to
enter, and to place these materials on the land taken for a
public use," etc. We cannot agree with this view of the
case. We do not believe that the company was clothed
with the right of entry. It was merely endowed with a
capacity to acquire that right, and, until the right was thus
acquired, we are at a loss to perceive wherein such an entry
differs from any ordinary trespass.
The entry being unauthorized, and therefore wholly un-
lawful, we fail to see any reason for making an exception to
the general rule which holds that wrongful annexations to
realty pass to the owner of the land. Such an exception it
seems difficult to sustain. The improvements have become,
by the wrongful annexation, as much the owner's property
as the realty; and as for paying him forthe increased value,
which has cost him nothing, that is no more than the public
is compelled to do in other instances,- as where the value has
been increased by improvements upon contiguous property,
upon which he never expended a penny. The exception is
repudiated in a later California case, and denied in Indiana
and New York.3 We are not aware that the question has
been raised, as yet, elsewhere. It is, of course, an entirely
Lyon v. The Green Bay, etc., R. Co., 42 Wis. 538; California R. Co. v.
Armstrong. 46 Cal. 85.
2 Justice v. Nesqueboning Valley R. Co., Alb. L. J., Aug. 31, 1878.
3 United States v. A Tract of Land in Monterey Co., 47 Cal. 515; Graham
v,. Connersville, etc., R. Co., 36 Ind. 463; Matter of Long Island R. Co., 6 N.
Y. Sup. Ct. 298.
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different question where the improvement has been made
with the permission of the owner, in which case he would
not be entitled to recover its value.,
We come now to the second class of cases, in which a
part only of the owner's property is taken.
First, The "just compensation" which, under the consti-
tutional provision, must be made where private property is
taken for public use, consists in paying to the owner not the
mere value of the portion taken. That, in very many in-
stances, would be to compensate him for the smaller part of
the damage done him. Just compensation includes both
the value of that which is absolutely taken and the diminu-
tion of the value of that from which the portion taken was
severed.2 In other words, compensation means the ordinary
value of the strip taken, together with such additional value
as attaches to it by reason of its connection with the adja-
cent land of the same owner. The inquiry should be, so it
is sometimes said, as to what would be its value to him,
situated as it is, if he were not the owner of it, but owned
the adjacent property on both sides of it, under the same
circumstances precisely that exist at the time of taking.
Second, Under the rule as stated above, it naturally re-
sults that, in estimating the injury done the remainder of the
tract, all the direct physical injuries, and even inconven-
iences, to be produced by the contemplated change must be
taken into account,3 excluding, however, all those injuries
I Emerson v. The Western Union R. Co., 75 Ill. 176.
2 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Lagrade, IO La. An. 150; Winona, etc., R.
Co. v. Denman, io Minn. 267; Scott v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 21 Minn. 322;
Petition of Mount Washington R. Co., 35 N. H. 146; Rochester, etc., R. Co.,
v. Budlong, 6 How. Pr. 467; Matter of Poughkeepsie, etc., R. Co., 63 Barb.
151; Virginia, etc., R. Co. v. Heray, 8 Nev. 165; Bigelow v. West Wiscon-
sin R. Co., 27 Wis. 478; Parks v. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co., 33 Wis. 413; Page
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 70 Ill. 324; Bangor, etc., R. Co. v. McComb, 6o
Me. 290.
3 Vanshoick v'. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., Spen. 249; White V. The Rail-
road Co., 6 Rich. 47; Bangor, etc., R. Co. v. McComb, 6o Me. 290; Mis-
souri, etc., R. Co. v. Haines, 3o Kan. 439; Jones v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
68 Ill. 380, 383; Parks v. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co., 33 Wis. 413; Watson v.
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 37 Pa. St. 469.
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and inconveniences which are not special to the land, but
are borne by it in common with the public at large., To
pay the owner for damages which he suffers only in the same
degree with the whole community, to whom no compensa-
tion is made, would be to indulge an unjust discrimination,
having no foundation in reason.
The law, too, excludes from consideration all contingent
damages. This means, that the award must proceed upon
the theory that the public improvement will be made in a
proper manner, with due care and skill. Any other theory
would be manifestly against public policy, and would tend
to introduce all manner of confusion. So that the courts
hold that, if the work was unskilfully performed, a recovery
may be had in a subsequent action, the original award being
no bar, because based upon the above theory.2 But no sub-
sequent action can be maintained for damages which should
have been included in the original award, but which, through
ignorance or mistake, were omitted.3 And it is immaterial
whether the damages were compulsorily awarded, or whether
they were voluntarily agreed upon, and a deed was formally
given by the owner. For it will be conclusively presumed
that, in fixing the consideration of the deed, all the legiti-
mate and necessary results of the construction of the im-
provement were had in mind.4
In illustration of the principle holding that contingencies
must be disregarded in estimating compensation, the follow-
ing Wisconsin case may be considered with profit. It was
a proceeding to condemn property for railroad purposes;
and it appeared in evidence that a protecting wall would be
necessary to protect the owner's property, in consequence
I Meacham v. Fitchburg R. Co., 4 Cush. 291 ; Upton v. South Reading,
etc., R. Co., 8 Cush. 6oo; Freede v. North Carolina R. Co., 4 Jones L. 89;
Winona, etc., R. Co. v. Waldron, ii Minn. 515; Lee v. Tebo R. Co., 53 Mo.
178.
2 Delaware, etc., Canal Co. v. Lee, 2 Zab. 243; Winchester & Potomac R.
Co. v. Washington, i Rob. (Va.) 67; Spencer v,. Hartford, etc., R. Co., lo R.
I. 14; King v. Iowa, etc., R. Co., 34 Iowa, 458.
3 Vanshoick v. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., Spen. 249, 253.
4 Brearsley v. Delaware, elc., Canal Co., Snen. 236.
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of certain excavations made by the company. Upon the
part of the company, it was proposed to show that the wall
was as necessary to it for the protection of its road-bed as
it was to the owner for the protection of his property; that
it had already instructed its engineer to construct the wall,
and had procured and then had upon the ground the neces-
sary stone and materials. The company also accompanied
the offer with an agreement to stipulate that, if it failed to
build the wall, the award should be no bar to a subsequent
action. The proposal was ruled out, the court holding that
the owner must be so protected that he need not in any con-
tingency be compelled to resort to a second action to re-
cover what he was justly entitled to receive in the first.r
The point has been made, in one or two instances, that
where the owner has gone on and made improvements upon
his property, knowing that a portion of it was about to be
taken for public purposes, he should not be entitled to re-
cover for the depreciation in value of the improvements so
put upon the land. But the point has not been sustained by
the courts, it being held that, where the improvements have
been made without malice, the owner is entitled to compen-
sation for the injury done the remainder of the tract, includ-
ing the improvements thus placed upon it.2 The Wisconsin
case cited below x will illustrate the principle. In this case,
the plaintiff had purchased several city lots adjoining each
other. At the time of purchase, and for several years pre-
ceding it, one of the lots had been used and occupied by a
railroad company, under a license from its then owner, the
plaintiff's grantor. After the purchase by plaintiff, he was
informed by the company that the lot already used by the
road was needed by it, and that, unless it could be pur-
chased for an agreed price, condemnation proceedings would
be necessary. The negotiations fell through, and the pro-
ceedings were instituted. In the meanwhile, the plaintiff
had erected a planing-mill and manufactory upon the other
x Thompson v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 27 Wis. 93.
2 Driver v. Western Union R. Co., 32 Wis. 569; Sherwood v. St. Paul,
etc., R. Co., 21 Minn. 122, 125.
VOL. V. NO. I. 3
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lots adjacent. The court held that plaintiff had the legal
and moral right to improve his property, and that the rail-
road was bound to pay the enhanced damage.
On several occasions it has been urged upon the courts
that, in determining the injury done the remainder of the
tradt, justice required the loss of profits and custom to be
taken into the reckoning. The principle has failed of being
sustained in a single instance., Anticipated profits are not
"property." They are not in esse, and only issue out of
that which is the subject of property. It has, however, been
held admissible to introduce evidence showing the effect of
the taking upon the business, not for the purpose of recover-
ing for any loss of business, but only to show the effect upon
the market value of the property; it being evident that the
use to which property is devoted, the kind and amount of
business done upon it, and the facilities for transacting it
inevitably enter into any estimate of the market value of
the property.'
Third, The value of the property taken and the diminu-
tion in the value of the residue is a debt due from the
public to the owner, and whether it must be paid in money
exclusively, or whether it may not be paid in special
benefits, exclusively or partially, is a question, upon which
the courts are not agreed. In Mississippi, it is held that
there can be no payment in special benefits, but that com-
pensation must be made in money, both for the land
actually appropriated and for the damage done to the re-
mainder of the tract; 3 while in Arkansas,4 Iowa,s Kansas,6
and Ohio,7 it is expressly provided by constitutional enact-
ment that there shall be no deduction on account of benefits.
1 Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich. 504; Fuller v. Eddings, ii Rich. 239;
Stockton, etc., R. Co. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139.
I Driver v. Western Union R. Co., 32 Wis. 569, 584.
3 Brown v,. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227, 242; Isom V. Mississippi, etc., R. Co.,
36 Miss. 300; Penrice v. Wallis, 37 Miss. 172.
4 Const. 1874, art. xii., sec. 9.
5 Const. 1857, art. i., sec. 18.
6 Const. 1859, art. xii., sec. 4.
7 Const. 1851, art. i., sec. 19.
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And under the provision in the Constitution of Illinois, that
"private property shall not be taken or damaged without
just compensation," it is also held that there can be no de-
duction for benefits.'
In other cases, it is held that while there can be no offset
of benefits as to the land actually taken, there may be such
offset as to the injury done to the remainder of the tract.2
In Tennessee, it is said that, if the Legislature so provides, it
will be proper to offset beneits as to the injury done to the
remainder, but not otherwise; and that the Legislature could
not authorize any deduction as to the value of the tract ac-
tually taken.3
Another class of cases goes still farther, holding that ben-
efits may be offset against the value of the property actually
taken, so that if the benefits were great enough, the owner
would not be entitled to receive any money consideration.
So, it is said that the true inquiry should be to ascertain the
value of the whole tract just previous to the improvement,
and the value of the remainder after the appropriation and
the improvement is completed.4 To arrive at this result in
I Carpenter v. Jennings, 77 Ill. 250.
2 Elizabethtown, etc., R. Co. v. Helm's Heirs, 8 Bush, 681; Sutton's Heirs
v. Louisville, 5 Dana, 28; Rice v. Danville, etc., Turnpike Co., 7 Dana, 81;
Jacob v. Louisville, 9 Dana, 114; Henderson, etc., R. Co. v. Dickerson, 17
B. Mon. 173; Shipley v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 34 Md. 336; New Orleans,
etc., R. Co. v. Lagrade, Io La. An. 150; Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Ferris, 26
Texas, 588; Jones v. Wills Valley R. Co., 30 Ga. 43; Selma, etc., R. Co. v,.
Redwine, 5 Ga. 470; The Mayor, etc., v. Central R. Co., 53 Ga. I2O; Ore-
gon, etc., R. Co. v. Barlow, 3 Or. 311.
3 Woodfolk 'v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 2 Swan, 422, 431 ; East Tennessee,
etc., R. Co. v. Love, 3 Head, 63; White v.'Nashville, etc., R. Co., 7 Heisk.
518; Memphis v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 508.
4 Matter of Furman Street, 17 Wend. 65o, 670; Matterof William, etc.,
Streets, 19 Wend. 678, 69o; Canandaigua R. Co. v. Paine, 16 Barb. 273; Mc-
Masters v. The Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 294; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Heister,
8 Pa. St. 445; Hornstein v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 87; The Com-
monwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. 491; The Commonwealth v. Middlesex, 9
Mass. 388; Nichols v,. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; McIntire v. The State, 5
Blackf. 384; The State v. Beackmo, 8 Blackf. 246; McCormick v. The Presi-
dent, etc., I Cart. 48; Indiana Central R. Co. v. Hunter, 8 Ind. 74; The
State v. Evans, 2 Scam. 208; The People v. Williams, 51 Ill. 63; Symonds v.
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cases where condemnation proceedings are instituted prior
to the making of the improvement, it has been held improper
to inquire of the witness as to what would be the value of
the property upon the completion of the improvement.
Had the improvement been already completed, there could
be no objection to the inquiry; but, being infuitzuro, the court
held that the inquiry should have been as to the difference
in value between what the whole property would have sold
for, unaffected by the contemplated improvement, and what
it would sell for as affected by it.x To ask what would be
the market value of property in the future, or after an im-
provement should be completed (in this case the construc-
tion of a railroad), was to introduce as testimony, so it was
said, that which did not "even rise to the standard of an
opinion. It is a mere guess, with no substantial foundation
on which to rest."
In a recent case in Missouri, it is held that the rule as to
.market value before and after the appropriation is not with-
out its qualification. In this case, which was a condemna-
tion of land for bridge purposes, the property consisted of
an east and west lot, the two being divided by an alley. On
the east lot (the one to be appropriated) stood a malt-house,
horse-power, pump, and pipe; while on the west lot was
situated a brewery, which the appropriation of the east lot,
with the fixtures thereon, would render valueless. So that
the amount of damages would be nearly equivalent to the
whole value of the brewery. The company had no need of
these appliances in connection with its bridge, and if they
could be transferred to the lot on the western side of the
alley, and so placed that'the brewery could be as effectively
operated as before, the actual loss to the owner would be
only the trouble and expense of removal. It was held that
the removal should be made, and that compensation would
Cincinnati, i4 Ohio, 147; Holton v,. Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 27; Winona, etc., R.
Co. v. Waldron, ii Minn. 515; Simmons v,. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., i8 Minn.
184; Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 258; Mayor, etc., of Lexington v. Long,
i Mo. 369; San Francisco, etc., R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 367.
' Watson v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 37 Pa. SL 469.
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include the cost of removal, and damages for the use of the
brewery for the time it was necessarily idle during the trans-
fer., And the same principle is enunciated in a Kansas case,
where land was taken for highway purposes, there being a
valuable hedge upon the property. As the hedge might be
removed with advantage to the owner, it was held that the
removal should be made, and that the owner should receive
compensation for the cost of removal to the place where
it was needed, and for any depreciation in its value caused
thereby.2
While benefits may be set off, the principle must not be
lost sight of that they must be benefits to the particular
tract from which the piece taken is severed. Benefits to
other lands of the owner, situated in the vicinity, cannot be
considered.3 But where a tract has been cut into city lots,
each lot is not to be considered as a distinct tract within the
meaning of the principle referred to. A division into lots
by imaginary lines is immaterial; if taken together, they con-
stitute a compact body of land, capable of being treated as
an entirety.4
In deducting benefits as against the part taken, the courts
are not agreed in the theory of its justification; for while
some of the cases hold that the owner has no reason to
complain, as he has lost nothing by the appropriation, in
others it is justified as an exercise of the taxing power, the
owner being taxed to the extent of his benefits. In Mis-
souri, for instance, it is expressly declared that the deduction
could not be sustained upon any other theory than that of the
x Hannibal Bridge Co. v. Schaubacher, 57 Mo. 582.
2 Shawnee County v. Beckwith, io Kan. 603. See Ford v. County Com-
missioners, 64 Me. 408, allowing damages for removal under certain circum-
stances.
3 Meacham v. Fitchburg R. Co., 4 Cush. 291 ; Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v.
Eble, 3 Pinney, 72; Winona, etc., R. Co. v,. Waldron, ii Minn. 515; Todd
v. Kankakee, etc., R. Co., 78 Ill. 530 (under former constitution).
4 Welch v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 27 Wis. xO8; Driver v. Western
Union R. Co., 32 Wis. 569, 586; Sherwood v,. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 21
Minn. 122, 124.
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taxing power., This latter theory is very well, if the doctrine
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Kansas is to be recog-
nized as a true exposition of the law. "The power of tax-
ation" was there declared to be "the most universal power
possessed by governments. It is coextensive with every
other power; it is an incident, a concomitant, an auxiliary
of every other power." 2 Such a theory of the extent of
the taxing power is not accepted with unanimity.3 And in
such quarters it would not do to justify a deduction of ben-
efits as an exercise of the taxing power.
In conclusion of the whole subject of benefits, it may be
remarked that their classification is into (I.) General Benefits
and (II.) Special Benefits; the former being those which the
owner enjoys in common with the community at large, while
the latter are local in their character, and enjoyed by him
in particular. And it is in this latter class only that, in the
process of deduction, benefits may be considered in off-set.4
We come at length to the third and last class of cases,
being those in which no portion of the owner's property has
been actually appropriated, there being simply a deprecia-
tion in the value of the property by reason of its proximity
to the improvement. Attention has been directed to the
fact that where a strip of land is taken, for public use, the
owner's right to compensation is not limited to the value of
the strip thus absolutely appropriated, but that his demand
I Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 258, 263. See Nichols v. Bridgeport,
23 Conn. 189; Holton v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 27; Washington Avenue, 69
Pa. St. 358, 361.
2 Leavenworth County v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479.
3 The People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452; The People v. The State, 23 Mich.
499.
4 Whitman v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 3 Allen, 133; Davis v. Charles River,
etc., R. Co., in Cush. 506; Hornstein v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 87;
Whitcher v. Bento*, 50 N. H. 25; The State v.,Evans, 2 Scam. 208; Freedle
v. North Carolina, etc., R. Co., 4 Jones L. 89; Little Miami,. etc., R. Co. v.
Collett, 6 Ohio St. 18z (under former constitution) ; Pacific R. Co. v. Crystal,
25 Mo. 544; Hosher v. Kansas City R. Co., 6o Mo. 303; Winona, etc., R.
Co. v. Waldron, 1i Minn. 515; Carli v. Stillwater, etc., R. Co., 16 Minn.
26o.
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also includes any diminution in value experienced by the
remainder of the tract. It may seem only reasonable, at
first thought, that if he is entitled to recover for the dimin-
ished value of his remaining property, then the owner of
the adjoining tract upon the opposite side should surely be
entitled to recover for the decreased value of his property,
although no part of it may have been actually "taken."
The law, however, and with good reason, holds that, unless
some portion of the property has really been appropriated,
the owner is not entitled to any compensation. His prop-
erty has not been "taken ;" there is as much of it as there
ever was. He is as free to use, enjoy, and dispose of it
now as before. It may not be worth as much, to be sure,
as previously it was; but the owner must take his chances as
to whether his property will be appreciated or depreciated
in value by improvements made in the vicinity, as much so
when those improvements happen to be made by the public
as when they are effected by individual enterprise. The
owner, then, has no right to demand that compensation be
made to him under such circumstances. And if he cannot
demand it as matter of right, there certainly are weighty
reasons of public policy against his receiving it as matter of
favor. Public improvements would be expensive luxuries,
if they did not become rare ones, were it necessary to make
compensation for consequential injuries. It is, therefore, a
well-settled legal principle, that no compensation can be
demanded unless some portion of the owner's property has
been "taken" from his possession.,
V Who is entitled to Compensation.--" Property," says
Bentham, "is a creation of law.". In a state of nature, there
was no such thing as property; and in the first stages of so-
ciety, all property was held in common. At a later period,
x Arnold v. Hudson River R. Co., 49 Barb. lo8; Radeliff's Executors v.
The Mayor, etc., 4 N. Y. 195; The People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188, 193;
Rogers v. Kennebec, etc., R. Co., 35 Me. 319; Hooker z. New Haven, etc.,
Co., 14 Conn. 146; Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 21; Davidson
v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 3 Cush. 91; Murray v. Menifee, 2o Ark. 561.
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the right to individual property came to be. recognized; and
now, by constitutional enactments, the sanctity of property
rights is as securely guarded against all arbitrary interfer-
ence as are the rights to life and to liberty, for "no man
can be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law," and "private property cannot be taken for
public use without just compensation."
In determining who is entitled to receive this compensa-
tion, regard must always be had to the nature and definition
of "property." As property is a mere creation of law, it is
not to be sought after in philosophic or scientific specula-
tions. That only is property which the law of the land rec-
ognizes as such., Then, too, the term "property" is, more
often than otherwise, erroneously applied to that which is only
the subject of property. "In a strict legal sense," so we
are told, "land is not property, but the subject of property.
The term "property," although in common parlance fre-
quently applied to a tract of land or a chattel, in its legal
signification means only the rights of the owner in relation
to it. It denotes a right over a determinate thing. Prop-
erty is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, and
dispose of a thing.
' '2
If we bear in mind that property is made up of certain
essential rights, and that any interference which substantially
abridges or subverts any one of these essential rights is pro
tamto a taking of the owner's property, we have found a rule
by which it may be determined whether or not a person has
been deprived of his "property," within the legal significa-
tion of the term. But any exercise of the powers of gov-
ernment which does not encroach upon the owner's right to
possess, use, enjoy, or dispose of his property cannot be a
taking of "property," entitling him to compensation. So
that, although the value of adjacent lots may be seriously
impaired by a change made in the grade of a city street, the
owner will not be entitled to compensation, nor have a cause
I Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378, 385.
2 Eaton v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 5 N. H. 504.
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o faction for the damage, as none of his property rights have
been impaired.' So, where the State undertakes any public
improvement, the necessary effect of which may be to
diminish the value of adjoining property, there is no claim
for compensation, as there has been no taking of property
rights.2
But use is said to be the real side of property; and it is
held that, although the title still remains in the owner, if any
physical interference annuls the right of user, it is a taking
of property, and compensation must be made. The flood-
ing of property with water, for instance, is such an interfer-
ence with the owner's rights of possession and of enjoyment
that he is entitled to compensation as for a taking of his
property.3
In all ordinary cases where a railroad is authorized to lay
its track in a public highway, the fee of which is not in the
abutting owners, they are not entitled to receive any com-
pensation for the consequential injury;4 and yet they have
such a peculiar right to the use of the highway which is ap-
purtenant to their lots that it is said to be as much property
as the lots themselves. So that any appropriation of the
highway, which deprives the adjoining owners of the reason-
able use of the street, or of access to and from their lots, is
as much a taking of property rights, entitling the owners to
compensation, as though there had been an appropriation of
the lots themselves; it not being material, in this view of
I Radcliff's Executors v. The Mayor, etc., 4 N. Y. 195; Murphy v. Chicago,
29 Ill. 279; Macyv . Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267; O'Conner v. Pittsburgh, iS Pa.
St. 187; Skinner v. Hartford Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523; Lee v. Minneapolis,
22 Minn. I3; Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 20.
2 Davidson v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 3 Cush. 91 ; Shrunk v,. Schuylkill Nay.
Co., 14 Serg. & R. 71; The Commonwealth v. Richter, I Pa. St. 467.
3 Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296; Eaton v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 51
N. H. 504; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 177; Hooker v. New Haven,
etc., Co., 14 Conn. 146; s. c., 15 Conn. 312.
4 In the Matter of the Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 6 Whart. 25; Millburn v.
Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa, 246, 261; Davenport v. Stevenson, 34 Iowa, 225;
Moses v,. The Railroad Co., 21 Ill. 522; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v,. Garside, Io
Kan. 552.
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the subject, whether the fee of the highway is in the public
or not."
In those cases where the fee is in the owner of the abut-
ting lots, the public have only a right of passage in the high-
way, for such purposes as a street is ordinarily devoted to;
and the construction therein of a railroad propelled by steam
is the imposition of an additional easement, entitling the
owner of the fee to additional compensation.2 Some few
cases have held a contrary doctrine, but it is believed that
the weight of authority sustains the proposition as we have
stated it above.3
A distinction seems to be recognized between steam and
horse railways, it being held that the latter, when laid in a
public highway, do not impose an additional burden upon
the land of the adjoining proprietor, although he is pos-
sessed of the fee of the land, the public having a mere ease-
ment therein.4 This distinction is repudiated in New York,
where the adjoining owner is held to be entitled to additional
compensation.S Judge Dillon, in his work on Municipal Cor-
porations, however, coilicides with the principle as we hav.e
stated it, believing such an appropriation to fall within the
Lexington, etc., R. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 289; Elizabethtown, etc.,
R. Co. v. Combs, io Bush, 382; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459; Cin-
cinnati Street Ry. v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Haynes v. Thomas, 7
Ind. 38; Protzman v,. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 9 Ind. 469; New Albany,
etc., R. Co. v,. O'Daily, 13 Ind. 463; Cadle v,. Muscatine, etc., R. Co., 44
Iowa, in; Anderson v,. Turbeville, 6 Coldw. 15o, 158. See Kellinger v. The
Forty-second Street, etc., R. Co., 5o N. Y. 2o6.
2 Williams v. New York, etc., R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Carpenter v. Oswego,
etc, R. Co., 24 N. Y. 655; Ford v. Railroad Co., 14 Wis. 616; Pomeroy v.
Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 16 Wis. 64o; Star v. Camden, etc., R. Co., 4 Zab.
592; Imlay v. Union Branch R. Co., 26 Conn. 255; Gray v. St. Paul, etc.,
R. Co., 13 Minn. 315; Harrington v,. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 17 Minn. 255;
Cox v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 48 Ind. 178.
3 Cooley's Const. Lim. 549; Redf. on Rys. (3 d ed.), sec. 76, and note.
$ Elliott v,. Fair Haven, etc., R. Co., 32 Conn. 586; Cincinnati Street Ry.
v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Jersey City & B. R. Co. '. Jersey City
& H. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 61; Hinchman v. Railroad Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 75;
Peddicord v. Baltimore, etc., Passenger R. Co., 34 Md. 464.
5 Craig v. Rochester City, etc., R. Co., 39 N. Y. 404.
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use for which the highway was originally dedicated or ac-
quired, and that the owner is not entitled to any further com-
pensation., And where the highway is used for gas or water
pipes, and for telegraph poles, such use does not seem to be
regarded as a new servitude, entitling the owner to compen-
sation, but only a necessary and proper use incident to the
street as such.2 So, where a common highway is converted
into a turnpike, upon which tolls are collected, the owner of
adjoining lots is not entitled to receive additional compen-
sation, as there is no new servitude imposed thereby.3 Had
there been an additional burden, there would also have been
the necessity of making additional compensation, as in those
cases where a railroad undertakes to lay a second track in a
public highway, having previously obtained a right of way
for only one track.4
The title of riparian proprietors on the banks of a navi-
gable stream extends only to ordinary high-water mark, and
the shore between high and low water-mark, as well as the
bed of the river, belongs to the State, and may be appropri-
ated, therefore, to a public use withoutmaking compensation.
5
But, although the fee may be in the public, the riparian owner
may have certain riparian rights, such as a right of access to
the navigable part of the stream, or a right to erect a landing,
a wharf, or a pier, for use in connection with his property,
which are valuable property rights, of which he cannot be
deprived without compensation. 6 In this connection, it is to
be understood that, in consequence of the great differences
existing between the topography and extent of the Ameri-
can continent and the British Islands, the term "navigable"
I Dill. on 'Mun. Corp. (Ist ed.), sec. 573.
2 Id., secs. 546, 552.
3 Douglass v. Turnpike Co., 22 Md. 219; The Commonwealth v. Wilkin-
son, x6 Pick. 175; The State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. 207; Plank-Road Co. v.
Cane, 2 Ohio St. 419.
4 Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Reed, 41 Cal. 256.
5 Gould v. Hudson River R. Co., 6 N. Y. 522; Stevens v. Paterson, etc.,
R. Co., 34 N. J. 532; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324.
6 Yates v. Milwaukee, io Wall. 497; Clark v. Peckham, io R. I. 35; Bris-
bine v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 23 Minn. 114, 130.
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has in this country a more liberal signification than it has
at the common law. At the commoi law, no waters were
deemed navigable in which the tide did not ebb and flow.
In this country, all waters are navigable which are so in real-
ity, without reference to any ebbing and flowing of the tide.,
It is sufficient that the stream is capable, in its natural state,
of transporting the products of the forests or mines, or of
the tillage of the soil, in a condition fit for market. It is not
essential that the transportation should be by vessels. Neither
is it essential that its navigable capacity be continuous; the
volume and height of water may be subject to periodical
fluctuations, rendering it unnavigable at certain seasons of
the year, and navigable at others. But the question of ca-
pacity must, in all cases, be decided without reference to the
effect which artificial improvements may have caused in re-
spect to the navigability of the stream.2
Compensation is only necessary where private property is
taken for public use. It is simply discretionary with the
legislature whether or not it will require compensation to
be made when public property is taken for another public
use.3 This principle must be received, however, subject to
qualification; for while municipalities may be possessed of
property which is public in the sense that the municipalities
are public, yet such property may be private as having all
the attributes of the private property of an individual. This
grows out of the peculiar character of such corporations.
"They have their public or political character," says Judge
Cooley, "in which they exercise a part of the sovereign power
z Carson v. Blazee, 2 Binn. 475; Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nay. Co., 14 Serg. &
R. 7!; Kates v. Wadlington, x McCord, 58o; Wilson v. Forbes, 2 Dev. 30;
Collins v,. Benbury, 3 Ired. 277; Elder v. Bucrus, 6 Humph. 366; McManus
v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa, I; Tomlin v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 32 Iowa, io6;
Castner v. Steamboat, i Minn. 73; Bowman's Devisees v,. Wathen, 2 McLean,
376; The People v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 461; Diedrich v. The Rail-
road Co., 42 Wis. 248, 263; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324.
2 Morgan v. King, 35 N. Y. 454, 460.
3 Indiana Central R. Co. v. The State, 3 Ind. 421; Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
New York, etc., R. Co., 23 N. J. Eq. 157; Clinton v. Cedar Rapids R. Co.,
24 Iowa, 455; The People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188.
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of the State for governmental purposes, and they have their
private character, in which, for the benefit or convenience of
their own citizens, they exercise powers not of a govern-
mental nature, and in which the State at large has only an
incidental concern, as it may have with the action of private
corporations."' And the property which such corporations
hold in their quasi-private capacity is denominated private,
to distinguish it from that which they hold in their political
capacity. It is believed that this private property of munic-
ipal corporations comes within the protection of the consti-
tutional provisions we have been considering. In New York,
however, it has been decided that there is no distinction be-
tween the public and private property of a municipal corpora-
tion so as to bring it within the meaning of these constitu-
tional provisionts.2 But in this case the use for which the
property was taken was one which concerned the city itself,
and the court expressly disclaimed deciding "whether the
legislative jurisdiction would extend to diverting the city prop-
erty to other public use than such as concerned the city, or
its inhabitants." We cannot believe that such a diversion
would be sustained, confident that the rule was correctly stated
when it was said, by an eminent authority, that, "when cor-
porate powers are conferred, there is an implied contract
between the State and the corporators that the property
which they are given the capacity to acquire for corporate
purposes, under their charter, shall not be taken from them
and appropriated to other uses." 3 To the same effect is the
language of Judge Dillon, in the Supreme Court of Iowa.4
In connection with this subject, that where public property
is taken no compensation need be made, reference should be
made to a somewhat remarkable case lately decided in the
Supreme Court of Michigan. The case is noteworthy, not
so much for what was decided, perhaps, as for what the court
Cooley on Tax. 482.
2 Darlington v. Mayor, etc., 31 N. Y. 164, 193. See also The People v.
Rochester, So N. Y. 525, 530.
3 Cooley's Const. Lim. 238.
4 Clinton v. Cedar Rapids R. Co., 24 Iowa, 476.
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was urged to decide. The case was argued upon the theory
that property public for one purpose was public for all, and
that where property had been taken for a particular public
use, it thereby, became public for any and all purposes, and
might be taken without compensation; so that one railroad
company had a right to appropriate, without compensation,
the franchises or property of another railroad, to aid in the
construction of its own road. The court, however, took a
different view of the case. "It will not do to say," so said
the court, "that property taken for a particular public use
thereby becomes public for all purposes. The public may
have the right to use it for certain purposes, and yet indi-
viduals or private corporations have rights therein at the
same time. These rights may be considered as private
rights, separate and distinct from the rights of the public.
Wherever such private rights exist, they are entitled to pro-
tection, and can only be divested in the same manner and
under the same laws that individual rights may be."'I
But it is to be borne in mind that it is not every taking of
private 'property for public use that entitles the owner to
compensation. The property of the citizen might be taken
under the police power of the State, and no obligation to
render compensation be imposed in consequence.2 So, un-
der police regulations, a person's property may be taken
from him in the sense that it is rendered perfectly useless
and valueless, although it has not been taken from him so
far as any question of title is concerned. A man may pur-
chase a building upon condition that it shall only be used for
the storing of gunpowder, and the legislature may thereafter
prohibit its use for that purpose, and thus render the property
worthless, and yet the owner would not be entitled to com-
pensation as for property taken for public use. Or, the
holder of a burial lot, in which no interments have been
made, who has purchased it under the restriction that it shall
I Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 35 Mich. 265,
273.
2 The People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; The People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich.
244; Philadelphia v. Scott, 8I Penn. 8o.
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not be used for any other purpose, may have its value re-
duced to naught by the passage of an act making interments
in the lot unlawful. Such laws would be a constitutional
exercise of the police power; and that, too, without making
any compensation to the owners thus deprived of the use of
their property.'
It has been urged upon the courts, that where private
property was taken in great emergencies, to prevent some
public calamity, like the spreading of a fire or the ravages of
a pestilence, it was such a taking for public use as required
compensation to be made, afterwards, to the owners. At the
common law, no compensation was required in such cases.2
But it was argued, the constitutional provisions requiring
compensation to be made where property was taken for a
public use were designed to include just such cases as
these. And Chief Justice Nelson of New York, while
doubting, in 1837, whether they actually came within the
provision, was certain that they came within "the spirit and
reason of the principle." 3 It appears to be conclusively
settled, however, that they do not come within the meaning
of the provision we are considering.4 A taking of property
under such circumstances is not a taking under the right of
eminent domain, and not necessarily under the police power
of the State, for it is a right which any individual may exer-
cise, without any legislative authority whatever. Salus pop-
uli suprema est lex, and Necessitas facit licitum quoad alias
non est licitum.
But to return to those cases where there has been a taking
of private property for public use, and compensation is to be
made to the owner. The term "owner " is used, in this con-
nection, to denote any person having any kind of legal estate
x Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 411.
2 Respublica v. Sparhawk, i Dall. 357; Russell v. Mayor, etc., 2 Denio,
474; Mayor, etc., v. Lord, 17 Wend. 297; Taylor v. Plymouth, 8 Metc. 465;
Ruggles v. Nantucket, i i Cush. 435 ; Hale v. Lawrence, 3 Zab. 590.
3 Mayor, etc., v. Lord, 17 Wend. 285, 292.
4 Russell v. The Mayor, etc., 2 Denio, 461; Beach v. Trudgain, 2 Gratt.
219; American Print-Works v. Lawrence, I Zab. 248; Hale v. Lawrence, 3
Zab. 390; Sarocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69; McDonald v. Red Wing, 13 Minn. 38.
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or interest in the property which it is proposed to acquire
by condemnation., It may be an estate in possession, re-
version, or remainder.2 All persons having proprietary
interests in the property are entitled to compensation, as the
fee or ownership is only an aggregation of these several
interests. Where the interests are distinct, no one should
receive the compensation belonging to another, but it
should be apportioned among them according to the magni-
tude of their respective interests; the proper mode in such
cases being to estimate the damage to the fee as if owned
entire and unencumbered by one person, and then apportion
the amount among all the interests which such persons have
in the property.3 Lessees and lessors, tenants for life, and
remainder-men are each entitled to receive their respective
shares of the compensation awarded.4 As between mort-
gageors and mortgagees, the rule of law is, that the fund aris-
ing from the sale of the estate is to be considered as a sub-
stitute for the estate itself, and the mortgage attaches to it
as such. The courts, therefore, will direct the application
of the money according to the rights of the respective par-
ties as they existed previous to the alteration of the estate.5
It has been decided, however, that a judgment-creditor of
the owner has no such estate or interest in the land as en-
titles him to compensation at the hands of the public. His
lien is regarded as a mere statutory remedy, in no way de-
pendent upon contract, and is, therefore, within the power
of the legislature to modify or take away. So that where
the law provided that title should vest in the public as soon
The State v. Easton, etc., R. Co., 36 N. J. L. 181. 184.
2 Watson v. New York Central R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157, 162; Parks v. Bos-
ton, 15 Pick. 198.
3 Coutant v. Catlin, 2 Sandf. 485; Wiggin v. The Mayor, etc., of New
York, 9 Paige, 16.
4 Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Foote v. Cincinnati, 1i Ohio, 408; Bal-
timore, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson, 1O Md. 76; Wiggin v. The Mayor, etc., of
New York, 9 Paige, 16; Colcough v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 2 I-ead, 171;
Turnpike Road Co. v. Brosi, 22 Pa. St. 29; Brown v,. Powell, 25 Pa. St.
229; Dyer v. Wightman, 66 Pa. St. 425; Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597, 602.
5 Astor v. Miller, 2 Paige, 68; s. c., 5 Wend. 603.
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'as compensation was made to the owner, it was held a dives-
titure of all liens upon the land which had not ripened into
title by sale.,
Where the land of a deceased person is taken for public
use, the heir, and not the administrator, is entitled to receive
the compensation; and this, notwithstanding the adminis-
trator may have previously represented the estate as insol-
vent, and afterwards obtained a license to sell the intestate's
real estate for the payment of debts.2 Mr. Scribner, in his
learned work on the subject of Dower, expresses the opinion
that the wife is entitled fo compensation where her inchoate
dower is taken under an exercise of the right of eminent
domain. "It may be," he adds, "that after the value of the
entire estate is ascertained, and the amount paid over to the
proper legal authority, particularly if she is a party to
the proceeding, her right is transferred from the land to
the money representing it; * * * and that if she fail
to assert her right to a portion of the fund, or if the author-
ity through whose agency the appropriation to public uses
is made neglect or refuse to protect her interest, she cannot
afterwards set it up against the land." 3 It seems impossible
to reconcile any theory which requires compensation to be
made for inchoate dower, with the great weight of authority
which holds that the wife has no estate or interest in the land
until dower has become consummated.4
A proceeding for condemnation is strictly between the
public and such persons as the public has made parties
thereto. If the public fails to make a party to the proceed-
ing any person whose estate or interest in the property is
essential to a perfect title, the condemnation is to that ex-
tent void, though valid as to the rest.5 The person holding
W atson v. New York Central R. Co., 47 N. Y. '57.
2 Boynton v. Peterborough, etc., R. Co., 4 Cush. 467.
3 2 Scrib. on Dower, 2o.
4 Moore v. The City of New York, 8 N. Y. IIO ; Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio
St. 547; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9;
Magee v'. Young, 40 Miss. 164; Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. St. 449; Noel v.
Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; Taylor v. Sample, 5, Ind. 423.
S The State v'. Easton, etc., R. Co., 36. N. J. L. x8i, 184.
VOL. V. NO. 1. 4
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the legal, as distinguished from the equitable, title is the only
necessary party to such proceedings.' And where property
is appropriated first, and compensation made afterwards, the
owner at the time of appropriation, as distinguished from
his subsequent grantee, is, in general, entitled to the compen-
sation, unless there is in the deed of conveyance an express
reservation to the contrary.'
VZ Compensation will not justify a Taking Jor a Private
Use. -The constitutional provisions we have been consider-
ing have had reference to private property taken for a public
use. In only three instances is there to be found, in any of
the State Constitutions, an express limitation upon the power
to take for a private use. Such provisions are to be found
in the Constitutions of Alabama, Colorado, and Missouri.?
We have seen that the right to compensation where private
property is taken for public use is a: fundamental principle
of law, and is not dependent upon any constitutional pro-
vision to that effect. It is equally a fundamental principle
of law, and equally independent of constitutional provisions,
that the making of a just compensation to the owner will
not justify a taking of his property for a private use. "As
between individuals," it has been ruled that "no necessity,
however great; no exigency, however imminent; no improve-
ment, however valuable; no refusal, however unneighborly;
no obstinacy, however unreasonable; no offers of compen-
sation, however extravagant, can compel or require any man
to part with an inch of his estate," but he will be protected
therein, "even to the extent of churlish obstinacy."4
I Hidden v. Davisson,.51 Cal. 138; McIntyre v. Easton, etc., R. Co., 26
N. J. Eq. 425.
2 Lewis v. The Railroad Co., ii Rich. 91; Rand v. Townshend, 26 Vt. 670;
Central R. Co. v. Hetfield, 29 N. J. L. 2o6; McLendon v,. West Point, etc.,
R. Co., 54 Ga. 295; McFadden v. Johnson, 72 Pa. St. 335. But see Har-
rington v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 17 Minn. 215.
3 Alabama, Const. 1875, art. i., sec. 24; Colorado, Const. 1876, art. ii., sec.
14; Missouri, Const. 1875, art. ii., sec. 20.
4 Bangor, etc., R. Co. v. McComb, 6o Me. 290, 295. And see Hardin v.
Goodlett, 3 Yerg. 4i; Memphis Freight Co. V. Memphis, 4 Coldw. 419; Tay-
lor v. Porter, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 140; Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 5I1; Matter of
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In some of the States, it has been expressly provided, by
constitutional enactments, that private property may be
taken, in cases of necessity, for private ways.' And in Mis-
souri, property may be taken not only for private ways, but
for "drains and ditches across the lands of others, for agri-
cultural and sanitary purposes." So, in Colorado, the pro-
vision includes "reservoirs, drains, flumes, or ditches, on or
across the lands of others, for agricultural, mining, milling,
domestic, or sanitary purposes." 2 In Kentucky, where there
is no constitutional provision on the subject, it is held that
land may be taken for a private pass-way when it is necessary
to enable any inhabitant of the State to attend courts, elec-
tions, churches, or mills, or to reach an established public
highway; but not for the purpose of passing from one tract
of land to another owned by him, or to a railroad depot
which may be the most convenient to his residence.
3
So far as the general principle is concerned, it is immate-
rial whether the attempt to take for a private use be made
under the guise of exercising the right of eminent domain,
or under that of the taxing power: There can be no taking
for a private use under either power. If the purpose 'for
which it is undertaken to levy the tax be private in its
nature, or, being public, does not pertain to the particular
district taxed, the attempt to tax will fail, because it would
be a taking of property for private use. 4
We have thus reviewed, as we have been able, the subject
of compensation as an incident to the exercise of the right
Deansville Cemetery, 66 N. Y. 569; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 658; Nor-
man v. Heist, 5 Watts & S. 171 ; Sadler v. Longman, 34 Ala. 3ii ; Osborne
v. Hart, 24 Wis. 89; Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pacific R. Co., 51
Cal. 577; Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333; Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell,
ii Nev. 394; Potosi v. Casey, 27 Mo. 373.
1 Alabama, Const. 1875, art. i., sec. 24; Colorado, Const. 1876, art. ii., sec.
14; Georgia, Const. 1877, art. i., sec. 3, pt. i.; Michigan, Const. 185o, art.
xviii., sec. i4; Missouri, Const. 1875, art. ii., sec. 20; New York, Const. 1846,
art. i., sec. 7; South Carolina, Const. 1868, art. i., sec. 23.
2 Ibid.
3 Robinson v. Swope, 12 Bush, 21.
4 Weismer v. Village of Douglass, 64 N. Y. 9i, 99; Opinions of the
Judges, 58 Me. 590; Scuffletown Fence Co. v. McAllister, 12 Bush, 312-
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of eminent domain. In conclusion, we are reminded of the
words of an eminent English statesman, spoken in reference
to the security enjoyed by every English subject under the
protecting ewgis of English law: "There stands the poor
man's cottage; the rains of summer and the snows of
,winter may enter its crevices, but the king of England, with
all his forces, dare not enter that poor man's cottage." It
was a proud eulogy of English law and English civilization.
The legal principles which we have attempted to set forth
in this article must clearly show, not only how sacredly se-
cure as against sovereignty itself is "the poor man's cot-
tage," but that the very soil which lies around and under-
neath it is so securely his, that not an inch of land can be
subjected to a servitude until he has first received, at the
hands of the public, a compensation which shall be to him
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